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Abstract: A classical method for ranking n potential events as sources of error is Bayes' theorem. However, a
ranking based on Bayes' theorem lacks a fundamental symmetry: the ranking in terms of blame for error will not
be the reverse of the ranking in terms of credit for lack of error. While this is not a aw in Bayes' theorem, it does
lead one to inquire whether there are related methods which have such symmetry. Related methods explored here
include the logical version of Bayes' theorem based on probabilities of conditionals, probabilities of biconditionals,
and ratios or differences of credit to blame. We nd that of all the methods described, probabilities of biconditionals
and a corresponding notion of logical correlation coefcients provide a particularly attractive method for ranking
blame for error and credit for lack of error which has the symmetry property we are interested in.
KeyWords: Bayes' theorem, error analysis, Probability of an implication, probability of a conditional, probability
of a biconditional.
1 Introduction: Bayes' Theorem for
Assessing and Ranking Sources of
Error
Error is a pervasive part of all computation and indus-
try, and methods for assessing and ranking potential
causes of error are always of interest. A classical
approach to assessing and ranking potential causes of
error utilizes Bayes' theorem. We are concerned here
with the general scenario where n mutually exclusive
potential sources of error are identied, S1; S2; :::Sn;
with corresponding probabilities of occurrence given
byP (S1) ;P (S2) ; :::;P (Sn). The conditional prob-
abilities P (EjS1) ;P (EjS2) ;...P (EjSn) ; are also





1   P (EjSi) and all the probabilities can be placed
in a tree diagram for n small. Denote by E the event
that an error occurred and denote by E the event that
the error did not occur. According to the law of total
probability, the probability the error did occur can be










= 1 P (E) ; i = 1:::n:
Now, given that an error did occur, we are interested
in the probability that the source of the error was
Si:These posterior probabilities P (SijE) are found
using Bayes' theorem, which states:
P (SijE) = P (EjSi)
P (Si)
P (E)
; i = 1:::n:
Once computed, these posterior probabilities can also
be used to rank the potential sources of error. A rank-
ing of the potential sources of error based onP (SijE)
can be thought of as a way of apportioning blame to
various potential sources of error. Similarly, a ranking




can be thought of as a way of apportioning credit
to the various sources for the error not having oc-













 ; i = 1:::n:
Thus given that an error occurred, Bayes' theorem can
be used to rank the various potential sources of error
for possible blame and given that the error did not oc-
cur Bayes' theorem can be used to rank the various
potential sources of error for possible credit.
We illustrate this with a model problem which we
will make use of throughout the paper.
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Example 1 A company manufactures items and three
mutually exclusive potential sources of error are iden-
tied. 40% of the manufactured items were associ-
ated with Source 1, 40% were associated with Source
2 and 20% with Source 3. Of those items associated
with Source 1, 95% work properly, of those items as-
sociated with Source 2, 90% work properly, and of
those items associated with Source 3, 93% work prop-
erly.
Let S1; S2; and S3 denote the events that a man-
ufactured item comes from Source 1, 2, and 3 respec-
tively. Let E denote the event that there was an error
in manufacturing, i.e. that the manufactured item was
in some way defective.
P(S1) = 40% P(S1) = 60%
P(S2) = 40% P(S2) = 60%
P(S3) = 20% P(S3) = 80%
and
P(EjS1) = 90% P(EjS1) = 10%
P(EjS2) = 95% P(EjS2) = 5%
P(EjS3) = 93% P(EjS3) = 7%
Furthermore we can compute using the law of total
probability
P(E) = 7% P(E) = 93%
and we can compute using Bayes' theorem















= 20% 3 P(S3jE) = 19% 3
Total = 100% Total =100%
Given the knowledge that the item is working prop-
erly we can apportion the credit according to the rst
column and given that the item is defective we can
apportion the blame according to the second column.
While the analysis we have described is standard and
correct, we note a lack of fundamental symmetry: the
ranking in terms of blame for error is not the reverse
of the ranking in terms of credit for lack of error. This
is not a aw in Bayes' theorem, but it does lead one to
inquire whether there are related methods for assess-
ing and ranking sources of error which do have such
symmetry.
The related methods which we will explore here
include the logical version of Bayes' theorem based
on probabilities of conditionals, probabilities of bi-
conditionals, and ratios or differences of blame to
credit. Of all the methods we describe, we nd
that probabilities of biconditionals and the related no-
tion of logical correlation coefcients have the desired
symmetry property.
2 Logical Bayes' Theorem for Rank-
ing Sources of Error
A logical version of Bayes' theorem has been de-
scribed by authors working in articial intelligence
[5,7,8] as well as in an earlier paper [2]. We re-
view the logical version of Bayes' theorem here. The
standard Bayes' theorem is based on the notion of the
probability of P given Q. The logical version of
Bayes' theorem makes use of an analogous, but un-
derstudied concept: the probability of P if Q The
probability of P if Q or if Q then P , is referred to as
the probability of a conditional, or the probability of
an implication and the statement P if Q is known as
material implication.
Denition 1 Dene the event
Q! P = Q [ P
The following theorem describes the probability
of a conditional.
Theorem 2

























Logical Bayes' theorem relates the probability of
the conditional Q ! P with the probability of the
converse P ! Q.
Theorem 3 Logical Analog of Bayes' Theorem (1):
P (Q! P ) = P (P ! Q) +P (P ) P (Q)
Theorem 4 Logical Analog of Bayes' Theorem (2):
Let Qi; i = 1:::n be mutually exclusive events which
exhaust the sample space. Then
P (P ! Qi) = P (Qi ! P ) +P (Qi) P (P )
whereP (P ) is computed according to the law of total
probability.
Conditional probabilities and probabilities of con-
ditionals share the same order relations. Therefore a
ranking obtained using the standard version of Bayes'
theorem will be the same as a ranking obtained using
the logical version of Bayes' theorem.
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Theorem 5 Let P;Q and R be events. Then
P (P jQ) > P (RjQ)
if and only if
P (Q! P ) > P (Q! R) :
Proof. We have










P (P jQ) > P (RjQ)
and vice versa.
We now resume with the previous example, utiliz-
ing the logical analog of the Bayes' theorem described
above. First we may compute using the initial data:
P(S1 ! E) = 96% P(S1 ! E) = 64%
P(S2 ! E) = 98% P(S2 ! E) = 62%
P(S3 ! E) = 99% P(S3 ! E) = 81%
Next we may compute either directly or using the log-
ical analog of Bayes' theorem the reverse probabilities
of conditionals.
Credit Rank
P(E ! S1) = 43% 2
P(E ! S2) = 45% 1
P(E ! S3) = 26% 3
Blame Rank
P(E ! S1) = 97% 1
P(E ! S2) = 95% 2
P(E ! S3) = 94% 3
The numerical example illustrates that values of
P (E ! Si)may be less intuitive than the conditional
probabilitiesP (SijE), but the ranking one obtains re-
mains the same. That is, one comes to the same de-
cision as to how to rank the sources in terms of credit
and blame whether one uses conditional probabilities
or probabilities of conditionals.
Note that when P (E) = 0, the standard ver-
sion of Bayes' theorem is technically undened, while
the logical version is never undened. From a
computational point of view, the logical version of
Bayes' theorem involves only additions and subtrac-
tions whereas the standard version involves multipli-
cations and divisions. Nevertheless, the logical ver-
sion of Bayes' theorem suffers from the same problem
as the standard version of Bayes' theorem: the lack of
symmetry in the ranking of blame for error and credit
for lack of error.
3 Probabilities of Biconditionals for
Ranking Sources of Error
3.1 Biconditionals
The probability of the biconditional P if and only if
Q, P (Q$ P ) ; is the probability that P and Q are
either simultaneously true or simultaneously false. It
is the probability that two events are logically equiv-
alent. The probability of the negated biconditional









probability that P and Q are neither simultaneously
true nor simultaneously false. It is the probability
that two events are not logically equivalent.
Denition 6 Dene the event




and the corresponding probability







The following theorem describes how the proba-
bility of a biconditional may be computed in practice
in terms of unions and intersections.
Theorem 7




P (Q$ P ) = 1 P (P [Q) +P (P \Q)
P (Q$ P ) = 1 P (P ) P (Q) + 2P (P \Q)
Corollary 8






P (P $ S) = P (P )




The rst two statements can be interpreted as say-
ing that P is logically equivalent to itself with cer-
tainty and P is logically equivalent to its negation not
at all. The second two statements say in words that
the probability of an event P measures the degrees
to which an event is logically equivalent to certainty.
The probability of P not occurring measures the de-
gree to which the event is logically equivalent to im-
possibility.
3.2 Logical Correlation Coefcients
When P (P $ Q) is near 1 we can say that P and
Q are nearly logically equivalent. This corresponds
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to P and Q exhibiting a strong direct logical correla-
tion. When P (P $ Q) is near 0 we can say that P
and  Q are nearly logically equivalent, which corre-
sponds to P and Q exhibiting a strong inverse logical
correlation. In this case the events are nearly comple-
mentary. It follows thatP (P $ Q) = 12 corresponds
to P and Q having a logical equivalence of 12 and a
logical correlation of zero. We formalize this and de-
ne a logical correlation coefcient for two events.
Denition 9 The logical correlation coefcient for
the events P and Q is given by
 (P;Q) = 2P (P $ Q)  1:
It follows that
P (P $ Q) =  (P;Q) + 1
2
and that
 1   (P;Q)  1:
The next theorem is quite fundamental in that it
gives conceptual justication for the preceding den-
ition. It says that the logical correlation coefcient of
two events is the probability that those events logically
equivalent minus the probability that those events are
not logically equivalent.
Theorem 10
 (P;Q) = P (P $ Q) P (P = Q)
Proof. By denition
 (P;Q) = 2P (P $ Q)  1
= P (P $ Q) +P (P $ Q)  1
= P (P $ Q) + (1 P (P $ Q))
= P (P $ Q) P (P = Q)
The next corollary shows how a logical correla-
tion can be computed in practice.
Corollary 11
 (P;Q) = 1  2P (P )  2P (Q) + 4P (P \Q)
The following are some algebraic properties of
logical correlation which the reader can verify.
Theorem 12












 (P; S) = 2P (P )  1
 (P;?) = 1  2P (P )
 (P;Q) = 0 whenever P (P $ Q) = 1
2
Continuing with our example, we rank the poten-
tial sources of error in terms of credit and blame using
the probabilities of biconditionals.
Credit Rank
P(E = S1) = P(E $ S1) = 39% 2
P(E = S2) = P(E $ S2) = 43% 1
P(E = S3) = P(E $ S3) = 25% 3
Blame Rank
P(E $ S1) = 61% 2
P(E $ S2) = 57% 3
P(E $ S3) = 75% 1
We note that for biconditionals:
credit+ blame = 100%
or
P(E = Si) +P(E $ Si) = 100%:
We can express these results equivalently in terms of
their logical correlation coefcients:
Credit Rank Blame Rank
(E;S1) =  0:22 2 (E;S1) = 0:22 2
(E;S2) =  0:14 1 (E;S2) = 0:14 3
(E;S3) =  0:5 3 (E;S3) = 0:5 1
For logical correlation coefcients, we have the equiv-
alent relation:
credit+ blame = 0
or
(E;Si) + (E;Si) = 0:
The fact that all the logical correlations are negative
indicates that for a given source, it is more likely than
not that an item was either defective and involved
with that source, or working and involved with an-
other source. This does not speak well for the man-
ufacturer. As we expect, the logical correlation coef-
cients yield the same ranking as the biconditionals.
Most importantly, however, we observe that the rank-
ing in terms of credit is the reverse of the ranking in
terms of blame which makes biconditionals particu-
larly attractive to us.
4 Credit-Blame Ratios and Differ-
ences for Ranking Sources of Error
Given a partition of the sample space into the events
Qi and given an event P , one possible interpretation
of the conditional probability P (QijP ) is the degree
to which one may credit the event Qi for the event P
APPLIED COMPUTING CONFERENCE (ACC '08), Istanbul, Turkey, May 27-30, 2008.





is the degree to which one may credit
the event Qi for the nonoccurrence of the event P:
In the case where the events P = E and P = E
are interpreted as lack of error and error, P (QijE) is





is a means of assigning credit toQi for
lack of error (credit). Our goal is to rank the events
Qi in such a way as to maximize the credit (for lack of
error) and minimize the blame (for error). One way of
doing this involves using the conditional probabilities










or a credit-blame difference
Di = credit-blame





The event with the most credit and the least blame will
have the highest credit-blame ratio or difference.
Instead of using conditional probability to formu-
late credit and blame one can use probabilities of con-

















Whether one uses ratios or differences the ranking one
obtains will be the same. However the ranking one
obtains using conditional probabilities will not always
coincide with the ranking one obtains using probabil-
ities of conditionals. The question then arises: which
method of ranking the events is preferred, the one
which uses conditional probability or the one which
uses probabilities of conditionals? The reader may
be tempted to prefer conditional probabilities just be-
cause of their greater familiarity. We demonstrate
here that there is merit in using a credit-blame dif-
ference involving conditionals. A ranking obtained
using conditionals will be the same ranking one ob-
tains using probabilities of biconditionals or logical
correlation coefcients.
Lemma 13 A credit-blame difference based on con-
ditionals can be expressed in terms of the probability
of a biconditional or in terms of the logical correla-
tion coefcient according to the following formulas:












































= P (P $ Qi) P (P )
Theorem 14 The ranking obtained using a credit-
blame difference with conditionals is equivalent to the
ranking obtained using credit-blame ratios, probabil-






P (P $ Qi) < P (P $ Qj)
or whenever
 (P;Qi) <  (P;Qj) :
Proof. The result follows directly from the previous
lemma.
We illustrate these ratios and differences going
back to our example problem. First we let P = E
and P = E: Employing conditional probability to
compute credit and blame yields the following rank-
ing:
Credit-blame Ratio Ri Rank
P(S1jE)=P(S1jE) = 68% 3
P(S2jE)=P(S2jE) = 141% 1
P(S3jE)=P(S3jE) = 105% 2
Credit-blame Difference Di Rank
P(S1jE) P(S1jE) =  18% 3
P(S2jE) P(S2jE) = +12% 1
P(S3jE) P(S3jE) = +1% 2
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However, if we employ conditionals to compute credit
and blame we obtain a different ranking.
Credit-blame Ratio ri Rank
P(E ! S1)=P(E ! S1) = 44% 2
P(E ! S2)=P(E ! S2) = 47% 1
P(E ! S3)=P(E ! S3) = 28% 3
Credit-blame Difference di Rank
P(E ! S1) P(E ! S1) =  54% 2
P(E ! S2) P(E ! S2) =  50% 1
P(E ! S3) P(E ! S3) =  68% 3
Observe that the above credit-blame ratios or dif-
ferences computed using conditionals give the same
ranking as the ranking based on P(E $ Si). Theo-
rem 14 and the previous computations lead us to rec-
ommend computing probabilities of biconditionals or
logical correlation coefcients and to dispense with
credit-blame ratios and differences in actual prac-
tice. Probabilities of biconditionals have nice alge-
braic properties, such as








= 1 P (P $ Qi)
and the corresponding logical correlation coefcients










which make them useful for computing an inverse
ranking. The ranking one obtains involving blame
will always be the reverse of the ranking involving
credit which makes biconditionals particularly attrac-
tive.
5 Conclusion
Our conclusions are that probabilities of conditionals
and the logical version of Bayes' theorem provide the
same ranking in terms of blame for error and credit
for lack of error as do conditional probabilities and
the standard version of Bayes' theorem. However
both of these methods suffer from a lack of symme-
try: the ranking in terms of blame for error will not be
the reverse of the ranking in terms of credit for lack of
error.
Probabilities of biconditionals provide an alterna-
tive method for ranking blame for error and credit for
lack of error which has the desired symmetry prop-
erty. Furthermore, a ranking based on biconditionals
will always coincide with a ranking based on a credit-
blame ratio or difference which utilizes conditionals.
Thus we conclude that probabilities of biconditionals
and the corresponding logical correlation coefcients
provide an attractive alternative to the classical Bayes'
theorem approach.
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